# Security Assessment of the DevPlace Web Application **An evidence-based refutation exercise against the claim that devplace.net is "unsafe in many ways", with a prioritised remediation programme for enterprise operation** | Field | Value | |---|---| | Engagement identifier | `record-20261110T004038Z` | | Client | DevPlace, operator of `devplace.net` | | Target | `https://devplace.net` and the literal addresses it resolves to | | Classification | Client confidential | | Report version | 1.0.1 (final) | | Report date | 2026-11-10 (UTC) | | Author role | Principal consultant, application security | | Methodology | `./.pentest.md`, phases P0 to P6, evidence contract of section 0.4 | | Assessment window | 2026-11-10T00:40Z to 2026-11-10T23:59Z | | Report status | Issued for client action | ## Document control ### Version history | Version | Date (UTC) | Author role | Change | |---|---|---|---| | 0.1 | 2026-11-10 | Principal consultant | Premise, scope and rules of engagement fixed before the first packet | | 0.5 | 2026-11-10 | Principal consultant | Reconnaissance and enumeration chapters; findings drafted from evidence | | 0.9 | 2026-11-10 | Principal consultant | Access control, injection and session chapters; refutation register completed | | 1.0 | 2026-11-10 | Principal consultant | Risk register, roadmap, retest plan and appendices; consistency pass | | 1.0.1 | 2026-11-10 | Principal consultant | Cross-reference, table and link corrections after internal review; no change to a finding or a score | ### Distribution list | Recipient | Role | Copy | |---|---|---| | DevPlace engineering lead | Technical owner of the application | Full report and evidence corpus | | DevPlace product owner | Decision-maker for the launch gate | Full report | | DevPlace operations | Owner of DNS, TLS and host configuration | The scope, findings and roadmap chapters, plus the DNS and TLS evidence | ### Handling notes This document is client confidential. It contains reproducible descriptions of exploitable weaknesses and must not be circulated outside the recipient list without the client's written consent. It contains no live credential: session cookies, API keys, passwords and recovery tokens are redacted as `[REDACTED]`. The two synthetic accounts used generated credentials that were held only in the operator's scratch directory, which is purged at closeout; no password or key is reproduced in this report or in any evidence file. Evidence files are referenced by relative path and are stored under `./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/`. The assessment was performed against a production system that serves real users. The rules of engagement therefore restricted interaction to read-only requests plus the minimum synthetic state needed to prove a class. No availability test, no destructive action and no bulk read of personal data was performed. The scope chapter states the resulting limitations plainly; the appendices state how the client can reproduce every result. ## Executive summary **The decision.** DevPlace intends to present `devplace.net` to an enterprise customer as safe to operate. This assessment was commissioned because an unnamed expert called the platform "unsafe in many ways" without naming one. The evidence supports a narrower answer than either position: **the controls that separate users from each other and from administrators hold, and the weaknesses that remain are in configuration, lifecycle policy and operational hardening.** No authentication bypass, cross-user data access, injection or infrastructure compromise was reproduced. Five medium-severity issues must close before an enterprise security statement can be signed. **Headline risk.** The most consequential weakness is the combination of **unbounded credential guessing**, a **six-character password minimum** and **registration that neither verifies the mailbox nor limits account creation**. Separately, the application publishes its **complete API contract, including 147 administrative operations**, and an **XML-RPC introspection interface that documents 379 methods with their required roles**. Neither disclosure grants access, but together they remove the reconnaissance cost that normally protects an administrative surface. An attacker does not have to discover what DevPlace exposes; the application tells them, in machine-readable form, and then does not slow them down when they try passwords. **The claim under test.** "Unsafe in many ways" is directionally true as accumulated hygiene debt — fifteen weaknesses across three severity bands, none above Medium — and false in the sense that matters to an enterprise buyer, because the authorisation model was tested in eight object classes and held in all eight. Confirmed and refuted hypotheses are recorded with equal rigour, so the client can defend both halves of the statement. **Top three actions.** First, remove `/openapi.json`, `/docs` and XML-RPC introspection from anonymous reach, or replace them with a curated public contract: one day of work, no functional loss, and a precondition for the enterprise conversation. Second, add server-side rate limiting and progressive lockout to every authentication interface and raise the password minimum to twelve characters with breach screening: two to three days, and it closes the only path found from anonymous client to account takeover. Third, require mailbox verification before an account can vote, post, message or spend AI quota, and remove the "Email already registered" oracle: three to five days, and it stops automated account proliferation and targeted phishing. The remaining findings are Low or Informational and belong in the same release train rather than a separate project. The remediation roadmap sequences all fifteen with dependencies and a definition of done; the verification and retest plan gives the acceptance test for each. ## Scope, assumptions, constraints and limitations ### Scope The assessment covered one web application, its two literal addresses, and the deployment configuration observable from them. | Asset | Type | In scope | Depth | |---|---|---|---| | `devplace.net` | Web application (apex) | Yes | Full: authentication, session, authorisation, injection, file handling, business logic, API, headers, disclosure, deployment | | `www.devplace.net` | Web application (alias) | Yes | Reconnaissance only; confirmed as a CNAME to the apex with identical content | | `95.216.15.238` | IPv4 address | Yes | Enumeration: bounded TCP connect scan and virtual-host behaviour | | `2a01:4f8:222:2c45::2` | IPv6 address | Yes | Enumeration: confirmed as the same host | | All other hostnames under `devplace.net` | Web | No | Resolved only; never contacted, because the client's authority statement covers the application, not an unbounded estate | | `*.pravda.education` and `*.tunnel.pravda.education` | Third party | No | Referenced by a CSP directive only; never contacted | The scope register, with the reasoning for each row, is at [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/00-legal/scope.tsv`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/00-legal/scope.tsv). The rules of engagement are at [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/00-legal/roe.md`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/00-legal/roe.md). ### Authority and its limits The client's engagement brief states that the application is to be assessed and that the expert's claim is to be tested. No countersigned statement of work, authorisation letter, non-disclosure agreement or data-processing agreement was supplied. This is recorded rather than glossed over, because it changes what a professional team may do: the assessment was therefore conducted **read-only by default**, with state changes limited to two synthetic accounts and the objects needed to test object-level authorisation. The full inventory of those changes, with identifiers, is the cleanup ledger at [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/04-impact/cleanup-ledger.md`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/04-impact/cleanup-ledger.md). Two synthetic accounts, two posts, one private project, four attachments and one follow edge remain on the system; all content is inert, carries an `ENGSEED` marker and can be removed by the client in minutes. ### Assumptions 1. The deployment examined is the deployment the client intends to operate. No staging system was in scope, and no evidence suggests that the production configuration differs from what a release candidate would use. 2. The published API contract is authoritative for endpoint coverage. Where the schema and the running application disagreed, the application was treated as the truth. 3. The two synthetic accounts represent the `user` role. No administrative account was available, so administrative behaviour was tested only from the outside, by attempting to reach administrative operations as an anonymous client and as an ordinary user. 4. A finding is a statement about this deployment on this date, not a statement about the software in general. ### Constraints | Constraint | Consequence for the assessment | |---|---| | Production system with real users | No destructive test, no availability test, no bulk read of personal data, no notification fan-out | | No signed authorisation | Read-only default; two synthetic accounts; no R2 or R3 action under the methodology's blast-radius scale | | No mailbox controlled by the engagement | Registration and password-reset flows judged by server-side effects; the delivered reset link could not be inspected | | Single shared host | Mail and SSH services on the same address were identified but not touched, because their ownership and tenant population are unknown | | 3000-request budget, 5 requests per second | Coverage prioritised towards authorisation, authentication and disclosure rather than breadth-first fuzzing | | One operator session | Coverage is declared explicitly; absence of a finding is never reported as absence of the weakness | ### Explicit limitations The following were **not** tested and must not be inferred as sound: - **Administrative functions from an administrator session.** Every administrative route was probed from outside and refused; the behaviour of those functions once authorised, including their own object-level checks, audit logging and input handling, is untested. - **Container and workspace execution.** The product offers container hosting and a workspace editor. Creating a container is an administrative or quota-bearing action; the isolation of the runtime, the container escape surface and the workspace editor's file handling were not exercised. - **AI gateway behaviour under adversarial prompts.** The assistant, its tool use, its system prompt and its outbound request primitive were not exercised, both because a call spends the operator's provider credit and because prompt injection requires a controlled model endpoint to be judged fairly. Guest access to the assistant is recorded as an exposure, unconfirmed. - **Mail delivery paths.** Password reset, email confirmation and notification delivery could not be observed end to end. The server-side request handling was tested; the message content and the link host were not. - **Denial of service, load behaviour and resource exhaustion.** Out of scope by the rules of engagement. - **Third-party integrations** other than by their observable interface: GIPHY, Telegram, push notifications, the node donation network and the federation peer protocol. - **Supply chain and dependency vulnerabilities.** No software composition analysis was performed against the application's own dependency tree. ## Methodology ### Standard and phase model The assessment followed the client's named methodology, `./.pentest.md`, phase by phase, and applied its evidence contract: an action without an evidence record is treated as an action that did not happen and may not appear in this report. The phases and their exit gates were: | Phase | Question answered | Gate | Outcome | |---|---|---|---| | P0 | What is being tested, for whom, within which limits, and what does success look like? | G0 | Premise, scope, rules of engagement, threat model and twenty falsifiable hypotheses fixed in writing before the first request | | P1 | What does the world already know about the target, with no packets to it? | G1 | DNS, WHOIS, certificate transparency, TLS metadata and published documents collected | | P2 | What is alive, what does it run, what does it expose? | G2 | Host inventory, 175-port connect scan, virtual-host behaviour, published contract, 209-operation unauthenticated matrix | | P3 | Which weakness classes exist here, proven, with a control for each claim? | G3 | Authentication, session, authorisation, injection, file handling, business logic, disclosure and configuration tested class by class | | P4 | What does an attacker with these weaknesses actually achieve, in what order? | G4 | Chains constructed and graded as demonstrated or plausible; no chain reached a critical outcome | | P5 | How far, how much data, what detection, inside the agreed blast radius? | G5 | Impact bounded to synthetic accounts; no third-party data read; cleanup ledger completed | | P6 | What does the reader do on Monday, in what order, and how is it proven? | G6 | This report, the risk register, the roadmap and the retest plan | ### Coverage model Coverage is stated per class and per asset, not as a feeling. The unit of coverage is the **tested operation**: an endpoint, a parameter, a header or a state transition for which a request and a control exist in the evidence corpus. | Class | Coverage on `devplace.net` | Method | Result | |---|---|---|---| | Authentication | Full for anonymous and user roles | Signup, login, logout, token issuance, reset request, fixation, timing, lockout arithmetic | Four findings, two refutations | | Session management | Full | Cookie attributes, rotation, invalidation, concurrency, entropy | One finding, two refutations | | Authorisation, horizontal | Eight object classes | Two synthetic identities, owner-positive controls, identifier substitution | No confirmed defect; eight controls recorded | | Authorisation, vertical | Administrative surface, 147 operations | Anonymous and ordinary-user attempts, REST and XML-RPC, including `system.multicall` | No confirmed defect; three refutations | | Injection | Server-side and client-side, sampled | SQL markers, XML external entities, stored and reflected markup, SVG seed injection, header injection | No confirmed defect; four refutations | | File handling | Upload, storage, retrieval, naming | Extension allow-list, content type, disposition, traversal-shaped names, access control | No confirmed defect; two refutations | | Business logic | Registration, profile, project privacy, federation export, quotas | State comparison before and after privileged fields; privacy toggles; export scope | No confirmed defect; two refutations | | Cryptography and transport | TLS, certificate, HSTS, cookie flags | Protocol negotiation, certificate chain, header matrix | One Low finding | | API behaviour | 209 GET operations unauthenticated; write operations sampled | Schema-driven matrix, method matrix, error handling | Two Medium findings | | Security headers | Seven response classes | Header capture per class | One Low finding | | Information disclosure | Documents, scripts, error pages, introspection | Published files, JS inventory, error bodies, RPC introspection | Three findings | | Deployment configuration | Ports, virtual hosts, DNS, mail authentication | Connect scan, Host header behaviour, DNS records | Two findings | | Denial of service | Not tested | Out of scope by the rules of engagement | Declared | | Container runtime | Not tested | Requires an administrative or quota-bearing action | Declared | | AI gateway abuse | Partially tested | Session and quota surface only | One unconfirmed finding | ### Tools The assessment used a deliberately small toolchain, because a production target rewards precision over volume and because every tool added to a report must be reproducible by the client. | Tool | Version observed | Use | |---|---|---| | `curl` | 8.18.0 (OpenSSL 3.5.5) | All HTTP interaction; raw request and response capture | | `openssl s_client` | 3.5.5 | Certificate inspection, protocol negotiation | | `dig` | BIND utilities | DNS inventory, resolution of certificate transparency names | | `whois` | standard client | Registration age, registrar, status | | `python3` | 3.14.4 | Deterministic request matrices, rate limiting, JSON and XML parsing | | External data | crt.sh, Cert Spotter | Certificate transparency enumeration | No commercial scanner was used. This is a deliberate methodological choice: a scanner reports signatures, and the weaknesses that matter in a bespoke application are missing authorisation checks, state machines that trust the client and trust boundaries that nobody documented. The matrix in `./.record-20261110T004038Z/scratch/matrix2.py` is about seventy lines of Python and is reproduced in the command corpus in Appendix B, so the client can rerun the same 209 requests and compare. ### Rate discipline and blast radius Every request was sequential or limited to four concurrent connections, at a ceiling of five requests per second. No test produced a 5xx storm; the single 5xx response from the target was a deliberate one-request probe recorded in [`E-29`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/29-p3c-error-handling-and-injection-probes.txt). The total request volume for the engagement is estimated at approximately 600 HTTP requests and 175 connection attempts, well inside the 3000-request budget, and no request was retried in a loop. The engagement never reached blast-radius class R2: no state-changing action outside the synthetic accounts was attempted, and every administrative request was a read. ### Evidence contract Each evidence record carries the engagement identifier, the UTC start and end time, the verbatim command, the exit code and the unedited combined output. Thirty-nine records exist, indexed at [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/evidence-index.tsv`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/evidence-index.tsv). The journal at [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/logs/journal.md`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/logs/journal.md) is the append-only audit trail: one line per action, with the timestamp, the evidence path, the action, the return code and the first line of output. Claims in this report cite an evidence identifier, and every identifier resolves to a file in the corpus. ## Findings Findings are ordered by severity, then by the ease with which an anonymous attacker can reach them. Each carries a stable identifier, a severity, a CVSS v3.1 vector and score where the weakness is technical, the affected component, the evidence that supports it, the technical description, a reproduction that a competent engineer can follow, the business impact in the client's terms, the remediation and the residual risk that remains after that remediation. Severity is assigned to the weakness as observed in this deployment, not to the class in the abstract; where the two differ, the text says so. ### F-01 — The complete API contract, including 147 administrative operations, is published to anonymous clients | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Medium | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — 5.3 | | Affected component | `/openapi.json`, `/docs`, `/docs/index.html`, `/redoc` (schema and interactive documentation) | | Evidence | [`E-06`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/06-p1-published-documents.txt), [`E-08`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/08-p2-unauth-get-matrix-no-redirect.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** The application publishes an OpenAPI 3.1.0 document at `/openapi.json`, 230,982 bytes, without authentication. It describes 453 paths and 519 operations, of which 147 are under `/admin` and 209 are `GET`. The document contains no `securitySchemes` object and no per-operation `security` block, so it cannot tell a reader which operations require a session — but it does tell a reader every operation that exists, every path parameter, every request body shape and every response code. The interactive Swagger UI is served at `/docs` and redirects to `/docs/index.html`. A control request to a non-existent path returns 404 with a 9,358-byte error page, confirming that the schema response is a real document and not a catch-all. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS https://devplace.net/openapi.json | jq '{openapi, paths: (.paths|length)}' curl -sS https://devplace.net/openapi.json | jq -r '.paths | keys[]' | grep '^/admin' | wc -l curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://devplace.net/this-path-does-not-exist-8f3a2b ``` The first command returns `{"openapi":"3.1.0","paths":453}`; the second returns `147`; the third returns `404`, which is the control. **Business impact.** The document removes the reconnaissance phase from an attack against the administrative surface. An attacker does not need to discover `/admin/backups/{uid}/download` or `/admin/gateway/providers/{id}/edit`; the application names them, describes their parameters and states their response codes. In an application with a robust authorisation layer, as this one has, the immediate impact is limited to information disclosure. The secondary impact is reputational and commercial: an enterprise reviewer who opens `/openapi.json` sees an administrative API with no declared authentication scheme, and draws the reasonable conclusion that the security model is undocumented. **Remediation.** Choose one of two strategies and apply it consistently. Either publish a curated contract that contains only the public operations, generated from an allow-list and served from a static file, or keep the full contract behind authentication and serve the public subset at a separate path. Disable the interactive documentation in production or protect it with the same session check as the administrative routes. If the full contract is retained for internal use, add a `securitySchemes` definition and per-operation `security` requirements so that the document itself becomes a security artefact rather than a map for attackers. **Residual risk.** Low. A determined attacker can still enumerate routes by other means, but the cost rises from one request to a sustained campaign, and the administrative naming convention stops being public. ### F-02 — XML-RPC introspection publishes 379 methods with their required roles and parameters | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Medium | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — 5.3 | | Affected component | `/xmlrpc` and `/xmlrpc/{path}` (XML-RPC bridge) | | Evidence | [`E-14`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/14-p3-xmlrpc-introspection.txt), [`E-15`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/15-p3-xmlrpc-authz-probe.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** The XML-RPC bridge answers `system.listMethods` without credentials and returns 379 method names, including the complete `admin.*` family. It also answers `system.methodHelp`, which returns a paragraph containing the REST route, the group, the required role and every parameter with its location and type. The help text for `admin.analytics` states, verbatim, "Site analytics - GET /admin/analytics, Group: Admin API, Auth: admin", followed by the parameter list. The bridge also supports `system.multicall`, which was tested with an ordinary user's key: the administrative call inside the batch still returned fault 403, so the batch mechanism does not bypass authorisation. The disclosure is therefore of the map, not of the territory. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS -X POST https://devplace.net/xmlrpc -H 'Content-Type: text/xml' \ --data-binary 'system.listMethods' \ | grep -c '' curl -sS -X POST https://devplace.net/xmlrpc -H 'Content-Type: text/xml' \ --data-binary 'system.methodHelpadmin.analytics' ``` The first command returns `379`; the second returns the route, group, role and parameters of an administrative operation, to an unauthenticated caller. **Business impact.** This is the same loss as F-01 through a second interface, and it is worse in one respect: the help text states which role each method requires, so an attacker can sort the 379 methods by privilege and attack only the boundary that matters, without experimenting. It also confirms that the XML-RPC bridge is a full shadow of the REST API, which doubles the surface that must be kept in step with any authorisation change. **Remediation.** Disable `system.listMethods`, `system.methodHelp` and `system.methodSignature` for anonymous callers, or remove introspection entirely in production. If the bridge is required for integrations, keep the introspection methods but require an authenticated session for them, and return only the methods that session's role may call. **Residual risk.** Low, conditional on the authorisation layer remaining correct. The bridge must be included in every future authorisation test; a second interface that mirrors the first is a second place for a check to be forgotten. ### F-03 — The login endpoint has no rate limit and no account lockout | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Medium | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — 5.3 | | Affected component | `POST /auth/login`, `POST /auth/token`, `POST /api/users/auth-token`, `POST /xmlrpc` with HTTP Basic | | Evidence | [`E-19`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/19-p3a-login-enumeration-and-lockout.txt), [`E-34`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/34-p3c-error-page-and-cache-headers.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** Ten consecutive failed authentications against one synthetic account returned HTTP 200 with the ordinary "Invalid email or password" page each time. The eleventh request, carrying the correct password, returned 302 to `/feed` and issued a session. No response carried `Retry-After`, `X-RateLimit-*` or any other throttling signal, and no account-lock state was observable. The same login is reachable through four interfaces — the HTML form, `/auth/token`, `/api/users/auth-token` and the XML-RPC bridge's HTTP Basic mode — so a limit applied to the form alone would not cover the class. The absence of enumeration at login (F-04 is a registration oracle, not a login oracle) means an attacker does not learn which addresses are valid from this endpoint; they can nevertheless guess passwords against addresses obtained elsewhere, such as the registration oracle or the public profile directory. **Reproduction.** ```bash for i in $(seq 1 10); do curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST https://devplace.net/auth/login \ --data-urlencode 'email=KNOWN_ACCOUNT' --data-urlencode 'password=wrong-password' done curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n' -X POST https://devplace.net/auth/login \ --data-urlencode 'email=KNOWN_ACCOUNT' --data-urlencode 'password=CORRECT_PASSWORD' ``` The first loop prints `200` ten times; the second command prints `302` and the feed URL. **Business impact.** An attacker with a list of addresses and a list of common passwords can test the pair space at the speed the server allows, indefinitely. The practical ceiling is the password policy, and F-06 records that the policy permits six characters. The combination is the only path the assessment found from an anonymous client to account takeover, and it is also the mechanism by which a credential-stuffing campaign against a breached developer database would succeed against this site. The absence of a limit also removes the signal that would let the operator detect such a campaign. **Remediation.** Apply three controls together, because each alone is weak. First, a per-account and per-source-address rate limit on every authentication interface, expressed as a token bucket with a documented ceiling and a `429` response carrying `Retry-After`. Second, progressive delay or lockout after repeated failures, with an unlock path that does not create a denial-of-service lever against a legitimate user. Third, a breach-list check at registration and at password change, so that the passwords most likely to be guessed are rejected before they are stored. Instrument failed authentications per account and per address, and alert on a rate that exceeds the baseline. **Residual risk.** Medium-low. Rate limiting reduces the guessing rate but does not eliminate it; the residual risk is carried by the password policy and by the breach-list check. ### F-04 — Registration neither verifies mailbox ownership nor limits account creation, and discloses whether an address is already registered | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Medium | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — 5.3 | | Affected component | `POST /auth/signup`, `GET /auth/signup` | | Evidence | [`E-10`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/10-p3-signup-account-a.txt), [`E-11`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/11-p3-signup-account-b-and-enumeration.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** A registration request with a username, an address in a reserved domain, a password, a birth date and a terms checkbox returns 302 to `/feed` and issues a working session immediately. No confirmation message is required, no mailbox round trip occurs, and no challenge is presented. A second request that reuses an existing address returns HTTP 200 with the field-level message "Email already registered"; a request that reuses an existing username returns "Username already taken". The two responses differ from a successful registration in status and body, so the endpoint is a reliable oracle for both identifiers. Two accounts were created during the assessment in under one second each, without any verification step. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n' -X POST https://devplace.net/auth/signup \ --data-urlencode 'username=unique-name' --data-urlencode 'email=unique@example.com' \ --data-urlencode 'password=TwelveCharPassw0rd' --data-urlencode 'confirm_password=TwelveCharPassw0rd' \ --data-urlencode 'birth_date=1990-01-01' --data-urlencode 'accept_terms=1' curl -sS -X POST https://devplace.net/auth/signup \ --data-urlencode 'username=another-name' --data-urlencode 'email=unique@example.com' \ --data-urlencode 'password=TwelveCharPassw0rd' --data-urlencode 'confirm_password=TwelveCharPassw0rd' \ --data-urlencode 'birth_date=1990-01-01' --data-urlencode 'accept_terms=1' | grep -o 'Email already registered' ``` The first command returns `302` and `/feed`; the second prints `Email already registered`. **Business impact.** Three consequences compound. An attacker can build a list of valid addresses at machine speed, which converts a generic phishing campaign into a targeted one against people who are known to hold an account here. An attacker can create accounts in bulk, which matters because accounts can vote, comment, follow, message and consume AI quota; the product's social signals and its AI spend are both exposed to Sybil behaviour. Finally, because no mailbox is verified, an account can be registered against an address the registrant does not control, which is the first step in impersonation and in the account-recovery confusion described in the methodology's authentication chapter. **Remediation.** Send a confirmation link to the address and hold the account in an unverified state until it is followed; restrict voting, posting, messaging, following and AI quota to verified accounts. Make the registration response uniform: accept the request, return the same page with "Check your mailbox", and send either a confirmation message or, for an address that already exists, a "someone tried to register with your address" notice. This removes the oracle without degrading the user experience. Add a per-address and per-network creation limit, and a challenge on the registration form once the limit is approached. **Residual risk.** Low. Address enumeration through the recovery flow is already generic (the reset request was tested separately and does not leak, see [`E-20`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/20-p3a-password-reset-and-open-redirect.txt)), so closing registration closes the practical oracle. ### F-05 — The domain publishes no SPF, no DMARC and no CAA record, and the zone is unsigned | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Medium | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N` — 5.4 | | Affected component | DNS zone `devplace.net` (Hostinger `dns-parking.com` nameservers) | | Evidence | [`E-01`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/01-p1-dns-inventory.txt), [`E-05`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/05-p1-ct-name-resolution.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** The zone publishes A and AAAA records, a Google site-verification TXT record and an SOA. It publishes no MX record, no SPF TXT record, no DMARC record at `_dmarc`, no CAA record and no DNSSEC delegation. Twenty-one hostnames appear in certificate transparency, including `jenkins`, `grafana`, `portainer`, `staging`, `mail`, `webmail`, `cpanel` and `autodiscover`; all of them resolve to the single in-scope address, and the server answers an unknown `Host` header with a bare 404, so the historical administrative names are no longer served. The reverse record for the address is `devplace.pravda.education`. **Reproduction.** ```bash dig +short TXT devplace.net dig +short TXT _dmarc.devplace.net dig +short CAA devplace.net dig +short MX devplace.net dig +short DS devplace.net ``` Every command returns empty except the TXT query, which returns only the Google verification string. **Business impact.** A domain with no SPF and no DMARC can be used as the envelope sender for mail that claims to come from DevPlace, and receiving systems have no published policy to quarantine it. For a platform that sends notifications, password resets and marketing mail, this is a phishing enabler against the platform's own users, and it undermines the deliverability of the legitimate mail the platform will need at enterprise scale. No CAA record means any certificate authority may issue for the domain, which widens the window for a mis-issuance to be exploited. The absence of DNSSEC is a lesser issue but is part of the same zone-hardening task. **Remediation.** Publish `v=spf1` with the actual sending infrastructure and `-all`, publish a DMARC record that starts at `p=none` with reporting and moves to `p=reject` once the reports are clean, publish a CAA record naming the certificate authority actually used, and enable DNSSEC with the registrar. Add DMARC reporting addresses that the operations team reads. **Residual risk.** Low once SPF, DMARC at enforcement and CAA are published. The historical hostnames remain visible in certificate transparency but are not served. ### F-06 — The password policy permits six-character passwords with no other requirement | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Low | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — 3.7 | | Affected component | `POST /auth/signup`, `POST /auth/reset-password/{token}` | | Evidence | [`E-09`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/09-p3-signup-validation-probe.txt), [`E-10`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/10-p3-signup-account-a.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** The signup form advertises "At least 6 characters" and the server enforces exactly that. A submission with a one-character password returns HTTP 400 with the field message "Password must be at least 6 characters"; a submission with a six-character password satisfies the server and proceeds to account creation. No composition rule, no breach-list check and no strength meter are enforced server-side. The same minimum applies to the reset flow. There is no maximum-length rejection below 128 characters, which is adequate. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS -X POST https://devplace.net/auth/signup \ --data-urlencode 'username=x' --data-urlencode 'email=not-an-email' \ --data-urlencode 'password=1' --data-urlencode 'confirm_password=1' \ --data-urlencode 'birth_date=2030-01-01' --data-urlencode 'accept_terms=1' \ | grep -o 'Password must be at least 6 characters' ``` The message is returned, which fixes the server-side minimum at six characters. The two synthetic accounts created during the assessment used 24-character generated passwords and are recorded in the cleanup ledger; no additional account was created to demonstrate this finding. **Business impact.** The policy lowers the cost of the guessing attack in F-03 and the cost of credential stuffing. Six lowercase alphanumeric characters is a space of roughly two billion combinations, which is small for an offline attack against a stolen hash and tractable online if no rate limit exists. The weakness is rated Low in isolation and Medium in combination; it is reported separately so that it is fixed even if the rate limit is deferred. **Remediation.** Raise the minimum to twelve characters, reject the ten thousand most common passwords and any password found in a breach corpus at registration and at change, and remove composition rules that push users towards predictable substitutions. Apply the same rule to the reset flow and to any administrative password change. **Residual risk.** Low. Rate limiting (F-03) and breach screening together make the residual guessing cost exceed the value of the account for all but high-value targets. ### F-07 — The session cookie is issued without the Secure attribute | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Low | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — 3.1 | | Affected component | `Set-Cookie: session` on signup, login and every authenticated request | | Evidence | [`E-10`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/10-p3-signup-account-a.txt), [`E-13`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/13-p3a-session-lifecycle-redo.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** The session cookie is issued as `session=[REDACTED]; HttpOnly; Max-Age=604800; Path=/; SameSite=lax`. `HttpOnly` and `SameSite=Lax` are present and correct; `Secure` is absent. The token is 64 characters from a URL-safe alphabet, which is consistent with 384 bits of entropy and is not guessable. The cookie is not rotated on privilege change, but no privilege change exists in the product for an ordinary user. Logout invalidates the session server-side, and a session fixation attempt was refused: a chosen pre-login value was replaced by a server-issued value and the chosen value did not authenticate. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null -X POST https://devplace.net/auth/login \ --data-urlencode 'email=KNOWN_ACCOUNT' --data-urlencode 'password=CORRECT_PASSWORD' \ | grep -i '^set-cookie' ``` The output contains `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=lax` and no `Secure`. **Business impact.** Without `Secure`, the browser will attach the cookie to a plain-HTTP request to the same host if one is ever made. The site redirects HTTP to HTTPS with a 308 and carries a one-year HSTS policy with `includeSubDomains`, so a conforming browser that has seen the HSTS header will not make that request. The residual exposure is to a browser that has not yet received the header, to a non-browser client that follows a link, and to an active attacker who can intercept the first plain-HTTP request before the redirect. The absence of the `__Host-` prefix means a subdomain that is ever compromised could set a cookie for the parent domain. **Remediation.** Add `Secure` and rename the cookie to `__Host-session` with `Path=/`, no `Domain` attribute and the same `HttpOnly` and `SameSite` values. The prefix forces the browser to reject a cookie set by a subdomain or over HTTP. **Residual risk.** Very low once `Secure` and the prefix are present. ### F-08 — The Content Security Policy does not restrict script sources | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Low | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — 3.1 | | Affected component | `Content-Security-Policy` response header on every HTML response | | Evidence | [`E-37`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/37-p3c-security-headers-matrix.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** Every HTML response carries the same policy: `object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self' https://*.tunnel.pravda.education; form-action 'self'`. Those four directives are correct and useful. The policy contains no `default-src`, no `script-src`, no `style-src`, no `img-src` and no `connect-src`, so script execution is unrestricted: any injected inline script, any `eval`, and any third-party script host are permitted. The same header set omits `Permissions-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy` and `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy`. `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` and `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains` are present and correct on every response class tested, including the plain-HTTP redirect and the static asset path. **Reproduction.** ```bash for p in / /auth/login /feed /api/users/1 /admin; do printf '%s: ' "$p" curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null "https://devplace.net$p" | grep -i '^content-security-policy' || echo 'none' done ``` Every line shows the same four-directive policy. **Business impact.** The policy does not create a vulnerability; it removes a mitigation. The application escapes user content correctly on the server ([`E-27`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/27-p3c-stored-markup-probe.txt)), and it loads DOMPurify for client-side rendering, so no execution path was found. The consequence is that if any future rendering path is missed, the browser will not stop the payload, and the API key material described in F-10 becomes reachable from script. In an enterprise review, a policy without `script-src` is read as a control that exists on paper. **Remediation.** Add a nonce-based `script-src 'self' 'nonce-' 'strict-dynamic'` and a `default-src 'self'`; add `style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'` only if the existing inline styles require it, and migrate them to classes over time. Add `frame-ancestors` (already present) and keep the existing `object-src` and `base-uri`. Report violations with `report-to` for one release before enforcing, so that the policy does not break the workspace and editor features. **Residual risk.** Low. A restrictive policy reduces the impact of any future injection from account takeover to a blocked request. ### F-09 — Authenticated pages are served without cache directives | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Low | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — 3.1 | | Affected component | `/feed`, `/messages`, `/notifications`, `/profile/{username}` and other session-bearing HTML routes | | Evidence | [`E-34`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/34-p3c-error-page-and-cache-headers.txt), [`E-37`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/37-p3c-security-headers-matrix.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** An authenticated request for `/feed` returns 200 with `Vary: Accept-Encoding` and no `Cache-Control`, `Pragma` or `Expires` header. The administrative routes, by contrast, return `Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0` on their 303 response. The application therefore knows the directive exists and applies it to the administrative surface but not to the user-facing pages that contain private messages, notifications and profile data. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS -b session-cookie.txt -D - -o /dev/null https://devplace.net/feed | grep -i -E 'cache-control|pragma|expires' curl -sS -b session-cookie.txt -D - -o /dev/null https://devplace.net/admin | grep -i -E 'cache-control|pragma|expires' ``` The first command prints nothing; the second prints the `no-store` directive. **Business impact.** A shared cache, a corporate proxy, a service worker or a browser's back-forward cache may retain a page that contains another user's private content. The application serves directly from `uvicorn` with no shared proxy in front of it today, so the practical exposure is the browser cache on a shared device and the history of a logged-out session. Once a CDN is placed in front of the application — a likely step at enterprise scale — the omission becomes a cross-user disclosure risk rather than a local one. **Remediation.** Send `Cache-Control: no-store` on every response that is rendered for a session, including the JSON API responses that carry user-specific data. Keep the immutable cache directive on the hashed static assets, which is correct today. **Residual risk.** Very low once the directive is applied consistently. ### F-10 — The API key is embedded in the profile page as a DOM attribute | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Low | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — 3.1 | | Affected component | `GET /profile/{username}` for the authenticated owner; static script `ApiKeyManager.js` | | Evidence | [`E-39`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/39-p3c-api-key-dom-exposure.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** The owner's profile page contains `` with a CSS mask in place of the value. The reveal button does not fetch the key; it reads `dataset.key` and swaps the text content. The key is therefore present in the page source, in the browser's memory and in any DOM snapshot, even while it is visually masked. A control confirmed that another user's profile page, and the anonymous view of the owner's page, contain no key element, so this is not an object-level disclosure; it is an exposure to anything that can read the page. The key is a UUIDv7, 36 characters, of which 48 bits are a timestamp and the remainder random; it is adequate as a bearer credential but is not a high-entropy secret in the sense that a 256-bit random token would be. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS -b session-cookie.txt https://devplace.net/profile/OWN_USERNAME \ | grep -o 'data-api-key[^>]*' | sed -E 's/data-key="[^"]*"/data-key="[REDACTED]"/' curl -sS -b session-cookie.txt https://devplace.net/profile/OTHER_USER | grep -c 'data-key=' ``` The first command prints the element; the second prints `0`, which is the control. **Business impact.** Any script that runs in the page can read the key, and the key authenticates the full API, including every operation the session can perform, without the `HttpOnly` protection that the session cookie enjoys. Combined with F-08 (no script-src), the defence in depth that would normally contain a cross-site scripting defect is absent, so a single rendering mistake escalates from session riding to durable API access. The exposure is also reachable from a malicious browser extension or from a shared-device DOM inspection. **Remediation.** Do not render the key into the page. Serve it from a dedicated endpoint that requires a recent re-authentication, and display it only after an explicit action. Store the key server-side as a hash, show it once at creation and on rotation, and treat the stored copy as a credential rather than as display data. Lengthen the key to at least 128 random bits. **Residual risk.** Low once the key is not in the DOM; the credential remains a bearer token and should be rotatable, scoped and auditable. ### F-11 — Guest clients are offered the AI assistant, with server-side provider spend | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Low (unconfirmed) | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L` — 3.7 | | Affected component | `/devii/session`, `/devii/usage`, the assistant surface behind them | | Evidence | [`E-36`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/36-p3b-method-and-auth-bypass-probes.txt) | | Status | Unconfirmed | **Technical description.** An unauthenticated request to `/devii/session` returns `{"loggedIn":false,"username":"guest","enabled":true,"guestsEnabled":true}` and `/devii/usage` returns `{"used_pct":0.0,"turns_today":0,"owner_kind":"guest"}`. The application therefore advertises a guest mode for the assistant, and meters usage against a guest owner. Whether a guest turn actually reaches a provider and spends the operator's credit was not tested, because a call would spend that credit and the assessment's rules of engagement require the minimum state change. The finding is recorded as unconfirmed and must be confirmed by the client before it is scheduled. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS https://devplace.net/devii/session curl -sS https://devplace.net/devii/usage ``` Both commands return the guest-enabled state without a cookie. **Business impact.** If guest turns are served, the assistant is an unmetered spend channel for anyone on the internet, and the quota model that protects the operator's provider account is defeated by clearing a cookie. If guest turns are served from a local model or are refused at the point of generation, the exposure is cosmetic. The distinction matters because the same gateway is documented as holding provider keys. **Remediation.** Confirm the intended guest behaviour. If guests may not spend provider credit, enforce that at the gateway rather than at the interface, and return an explicit refusal. If guests may spend, bind the guest quota to a server-side fingerprint with a low ceiling, and alert on aggregate guest spend. **Residual risk.** Unknown until the behaviour is confirmed; the control is cheap either way. ### F-12 — State-changing operations are reachable by GET, including logout | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Low | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N` — 3.1 | | Affected component | `GET /auth/logout`, `GET /notifications/open/{uid}`, `GET /profile/{username}/delete` | | Evidence | [`E-13`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/13-p3a-session-lifecycle-redo.txt), [`E-30`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/30-p3b-notification-open-idor.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** Logout is performed by a GET request, which invalidates the session server-side and returns 302 to the landing page. Opening a notification is also a GET, which marks it read. The account-deletion route has both a GET page and a POST action; only the GET page was requested. `SameSite=Lax` on the session cookie means a cross-site GET does not carry the cookie in modern browsers, so the practical cross-site request forgery risk is low, but the pattern violates the method semantics that the rest of the application follows and makes the endpoints reachable from a link, a prefetch or an image tag in a context where the cookie is sent. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS -b session-cookie.txt -D - -o /dev/null https://devplace.net/auth/logout | grep -i '^location' ``` The response is `302` with `Location: /`, and the cookie no longer authenticates. **Business impact.** A logout link that fires on prefetch can end a session unexpectedly; a notification that is marked read by a prefetch loses its unread state. The impact is limited to integrity of small state, and no cross-user effect was found. **Remediation.** Move logout and notification acknowledgement to POST with a CSRF token, and keep the GET route as a confirmation page. Apply the same rule to any other GET route that mutates state, and add a test that fails when a route with a mutating handler is registered for GET. **Residual risk.** Negligible. ### F-13 — The application address also accepts SMTP, IMAP, IMAPS and SSH connections | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Informational | | CVSS v3.1 | None assigned; the weakness is an exposure observation, not a scored vulnerability | | Affected component | `95.216.15.238`, ports 22, 25, 143, 993 | | Evidence | [`E-38`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/38-p2-connect-scan-top200.txt) | | Status | Confirmed (exposure); ownership of the mail service unconfirmed | **Technical description.** A bounded connect scan of 175 candidate TCP ports found six open: 22 (SSH), 25 (SMTP), 80 (HTTP), 143 (IMAP), 443 (HTTPS) and 993 (IMAPS). The application is served on 80 and 443. No banner was retrieved from 22, 25, 143 or 993 and no protocol interaction was attempted, because the ownership and tenant population of those services are unknown and the rules of engagement forbid testing them. The DNS zone publishes no MX record, so the mail service is not the domain's declared mail exchanger. The address is described by the client as a shared Hetzner host. **Reproduction.** ```bash python3 ./.record-20261110T004038Z/scratch/portscan.py ``` The script prints the six open ports and the connect latency for each. It performs a TCP connect and close, with no payload. **Business impact.** An application host that also exposes mail and remote-shell services has a larger patch surface and a larger credential surface than the application requires. If the mail service belongs to the client, it is an unmanaged entry point into the same address that serves the application; if it belongs to the hosting provider or another tenant, it is an out-of-scope dependency that the client cannot patch and should not share an address with. The observation is Informational because no weakness was demonstrated in those services; it becomes a finding only if the client confirms ownership and exposes them deliberately. **Remediation.** Confirm ownership of ports 25, 143 and 993. If they belong to the application's host, move the application to an address that serves only 80 and 443, or restrict the mail and SSH ports by firewall to the addresses that need them. If they belong to the provider, record the shared-address dependency in the risk register and confirm with the provider that the services are patched and monitored. **Residual risk.** Depends on the ownership answer; the application itself is unaffected. ### F-14 — An out-of-range numeric identifier produces an unhandled server error | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Informational | | CVSS v3.1 | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N` — 0.0 | | Affected component | `GET /api/users/{user_id}` | | Evidence | [`E-29`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/29-p3c-error-handling-and-injection-probes.txt), [`E-34`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/34-p3c-error-page-and-cache-headers.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** A user identifier larger than a 64-bit integer (`/api/users/99999999999999999999`) returns HTTP 500 with a 9,311-byte error page titled "Server Error". The page is generic: it contains no traceback, no framework name, no file path and no exception text, and the three occurrences of the string `/app/` in it are part of the `apple-mobile-web-app-capable` meta tag, not a filesystem path. Every other malformed identifier tested — a non-numeric value, a negative value, a missing parameter, an out-of-range rant and an out-of-range comment — returned a controlled 200 with a JSON error body or a 404. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://devplace.net/api/users/99999999999999999999 curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://devplace.net/api/users/abc ``` The first prints `500`; the second prints `200` with a controlled "User not found" body. **Business impact.** The defect is a robustness issue rather than a disclosure. It indicates that the numeric path parameter is parsed without a range guard before it reaches the database driver, and it produces an error response that monitoring will treat as a server fault. An attacker can use it to generate noise in the operator's error budget, but not to learn anything or to affect other users. **Remediation.** Constrain the path parameter to a 64-bit signed integer at the framework level, and return 404 for values outside the range. Add a regression test that asserts a controlled response for the boundary values. **Residual risk.** Negligible. ### F-15 — `robots.txt` and the public documentation disclose internal and administrative routes | Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | Informational | | CVSS v3.1 | None assigned; overlaps F-01 and F-02 | | Affected component | `/robots.txt`, `/docs/download.md`, `/docs/*.html`, `/sitemap.xml` | | Evidence | [`E-06`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/06-p1-published-documents.txt) | | Status | Confirmed | **Technical description.** `robots.txt` disallows `/admin/`, `/messages`, `/notifications`, `/reports/mine`, `/uploads/` and `/profile/*/delete`, which is a directory of the sensitive areas of the application. The site publishes a 668,491-byte documentation download at `/docs/download.md` that describes administrative features, container environment keys, the API key model and the workspace trust model, and a 1,865,698-byte sitemap that enumerates public content. No `.well-known/security.txt` exists. **Reproduction.** ```bash curl -sS https://devplace.net/robots.txt curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{size_download}\n' https://devplace.net/docs/download.md curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://devplace.net/.well-known/security.txt ``` The first prints the disallow list; the second prints `200 668491`; the third prints `404`. **Business impact.** The disclosure duplicates, in weaker form, what F-01 and F-02 already provide. Its independent value is to confirm to a casual attacker that an administrative console exists and where it lives. The documentation is legitimately public — it is the product manual — but it describes administrative-only features and container environment keys, which is more architectural detail than a public manual requires. **Remediation.** Remove the administrative entries from `robots.txt` and rely on authentication rather than obscurity; a `Disallow` line is an advertisement. Review the public documentation for administrative implementation detail and move it behind authentication. Publish `/.well-known/security.txt` with a contact address and a disclosure policy. **Residual risk.** Negligible once F-01 and F-02 are closed. ## Risk register The register is the single table of record. Severity is the finding's assigned band; score is the CVSS v3.1 base score where one applies. "Fix priority" is owner-agnostic: it says what to do first, not who should do it. Status is `Open` for every finding in this issue, because no remediation has yet been verified. | ID | Finding | Severity | Score | Asset | Status | Fix priority | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | F-01 | Full API contract published anonymously, including 147 administrative operations | Medium | 5.3 | API documentation surface | Open | P1 | | F-02 | XML-RPC introspection discloses 379 methods with roles and parameters | Medium | 5.3 | XML-RPC bridge | Open | P1 | | F-03 | No rate limit or lockout on authentication | Medium | 5.3 | Authentication endpoints | Open | P1 | | F-04 | No mailbox verification, unlimited account creation, registration oracle | Medium | 5.3 | Registration | Open | P1 | | F-05 | No SPF, DMARC, CAA or DNSSEC for the domain | Medium | 5.4 | DNS zone | Open | P1 | | F-06 | Six-character password minimum, no breach screening | Low | 3.7 | Registration, reset | Open | P1 | | F-07 | Session cookie issued without `Secure` | Low | 3.1 | Session management | Open | P2 | | F-08 | CSP has no `script-src` or `default-src`; no Permissions-Policy | Low | 3.1 | Every HTML response | Open | P2 | | F-09 | Authenticated pages lack cache directives | Low | 3.1 | Session-bearing HTML | Open | P3 | | F-10 | API key embedded in the owner's profile DOM | Low | 3.1 | Profile page, API keys | Open | P2 | | F-11 | Guest clients offered the AI assistant with server-side spend (unconfirmed) | Low | 3.7 | Devii assistant | Open | P2 | | F-12 | State-changing GET routes, including logout | Low | 3.1 | Logout, notifications | Open | P3 | | F-13 | SMTP, IMAP, IMAPS and SSH open on the application address | Informational | 0.0 | Host 95.216.15.238 | Open | P3 | | F-14 | Out-of-range identifier returns an unhandled 500 | Informational | 0.0 | `/api/users/{id}` | Open | P3 | | F-15 | `robots.txt` and public docs disclose internal routes and admin detail | Informational | 0.0 | Published documents | Open | P3 | ### Distribution | Band | Count | Findings | |---|---|---| | Critical | 0 | None | | High | 0 | None | | Medium | 5 | F-01, F-02, F-03, F-04, F-05 | | Low | 7 | F-06, F-07, F-08, F-09, F-10, F-11, F-12 | | Informational | 3 | F-13, F-14, F-15 | ### What the register does not contain The register is not a statement that the application is free of high-severity weaknesses. It is a statement that none was reproduced within the declared coverage. Two classes carry the largest unexamined risk and are declared in the scope limitations: the behaviour of administrative functions once authorised, and the isolation of the container and workspace runtime. A high-severity defect in either would not have been visible to this assessment, and the client should commission a scoped follow-up before making a statement about those areas. ## Attack narrative The narrative distinguishes **demonstrated** chains, which were executed end to end within the rules of engagement, from **plausible** chains, which are assembled from confirmed findings but whose final step was not executed because it would have required a real victim, real data or a destructive action. No chain reached a critical outcome. The value of the section is to show the client why the individual Medium findings belong in one release train rather than three. ### Chain 1 — Account enumeration to credential guessing to account takeover (demonstrated to step three) This is the only chain the assessment carried to a point where the next step would have harmed a real user. 1. **Enumerate.** `POST /auth/signup` with an address returns "Email already registered" when the address exists and 302 to `/feed` when it does not ([`E-11`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/11-p3-signup-account-b-and-enumeration.txt)). The endpoint has no rate limit, so a list of candidate addresses can be classified at the speed the server allows. Demonstrated. 2. **Select.** The public profile directory and the sitemap supply usernames in bulk, and the profile API returns a stable numeric identifier for each ([`E-08`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/08-p2-unauth-get-matrix-no-redirect.txt)). Address candidates then come from the usual developer-community sources, or from the username itself where the pattern is predictable. Demonstrated for the username and identifier step; the address step depends on data the platform does not itself publish. 3. **Guess.** `POST /auth/login` accepts an unlimited number of failures and does not lock the account: ten failures followed by the correct password returned 302 and a session ([`E-19`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/19-p3a-login-enumeration-and-lockout.txt)). The password policy permits six characters (F-06). Demonstrated. The next step — succeeding against a real account — was not attempted. The chain is nevertheless the most important one in the report, because every step is cheap, none requires a tool beyond `curl`, and the only control standing between step three and a takeover is the password a user chose. The remediation that breaks the chain is the combination in F-03 and F-04: rate limiting, verification and a stronger policy. ### Chain 2 — Public contract to targeted administrative attack (plausible) 1. `GET /openapi.json` returns 453 paths, 147 of them administrative ([`E-06`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/06-p1-published-documents.txt)). Demonstrated. 2. `system.methodHelp` on the XML-RPC bridge returns the required role and the parameter list for each of 379 methods, including the administrative family ([`E-15`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/15-p3-xmlrpc-authz-probe.txt)). Demonstrated. 3. An attacker sorts the methods by role, selects the administrative read operations that return the most data, and probes them for a missing check. **Not demonstrated**: every administrative route tested refused an anonymous client and an ordinary user, through REST (303 to the login page, 403 from the JSON API), through XML-RPC (fault 403) and through `system.multicall` (fault 403), as recorded in [`E-25`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/25-p3b-cors-and-vertical-authz.txt) and [`E-36`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/36-p3b-method-and-auth-bypass-probes.txt). The chain is plausible rather than demonstrated because its final step depends on a defect that this assessment did not find. Its importance is that the cost of the first two steps is two requests, so any future authorisation mistake anywhere in the 147 administrative operations is immediately reachable by anyone, with no discovery phase and no warning. Closing F-01 and F-02 converts a one-request attack into a campaign that the operator can detect. ### Chain 3 — Domain spoofing to credential phishing (plausible) 1. The zone publishes no SPF and no DMARC record ([`E-01`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/01-p1-dns-inventory.txt)). Demonstrated. 2. An attacker sends mail that claims to be from `devplace.net` to addresses harvested through Chain 1, pointing at a lookalike login page. **Not demonstrated**: sending mail to third parties is forbidden by the rules of engagement, and no message was sent. 3. A recipient who reuses a password hands over credentials that the unlimited login endpoint accepts. **Not demonstrated** for the same reason. The chain matters commercially because the platform's own notifications, password resets and invitations are the messages its users are trained to trust. A domain that cannot be distinguished from a spoof is a liability for every one of those messages. ### What did not chain The following were tested specifically to see whether they would compose into a more severe outcome, and each held. | Attempted composition | Result | Evidence | |---|---|---| | Object identifier substitution across two accounts, six object classes | Refused or indistinguishable from not-found in every class | [`E-22`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/22-p3b-post-edit-idor.txt), [`E-23`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/23-p3c-upload-serving-and-access.txt), [`E-30`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/30-p3b-notification-open-idor.txt), [`E-35`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/35-p3b-private-project-access.txt) | | Private profile tab read by another user | The tab is not rendered for a non-owner | [`E-16`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/16-p3b-profile-private-tab-authz.txt), [`E-17`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/17-p3b-notification-idor-with-seeded-event.txt) | | Ordinary user reaching the administrative surface by REST, XML-RPC or multicall | Refused in all three | [`E-25`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/25-p3b-cors-and-vertical-authz.txt), [`E-36`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/36-p3b-method-and-auth-bypass-probes.txt) | | Mass assignment of role, score, verification or API key through the profile update | Fields ignored; state unchanged | [`E-26`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/26-p3c-mass-assignment-profile-update.txt) | | Stored markup in a post rendering as script for another user | Escaped in HTML, meta tags and JSON-LD | [`E-27`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/27-p3c-stored-markup-probe.txt) | | Reflected markup in search parameters | Escaped | [`E-33`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/33-p3c-reflected-xss-and-token-endpoints.txt) | | SVG injection through the avatar seed | Seed rejected with 404 | [`E-28`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/28-p3c-avatar-svg-injection.txt) | | Upload of active content, and traversal in the stored filename | Extension refused; storage name generated; served as attachment | [`E-24`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/24-p3c-upload-active-content-and-filename.txt) | | XML external entity, and entity expansion in the RPC parser | DTD-bearing documents rejected with 400 | [`E-33`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/33-p3c-reflected-xss-and-token-endpoints.txt) | | Host header injection into absolute URLs and the reset link | The server refuses unknown hosts with a bare 404 and does not reflect the header | [`E-32`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/32-p3c-host-header-injection.txt) | | Session fixation and post-logout replay | Server-issued value replaces a chosen value; logout invalidates server-side | [`E-13`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/13-p3a-session-lifecycle-redo.txt) | | CORS reflection with credentials | No `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header on any endpoint tested | [`E-25`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/25-p3b-cors-and-vertical-authz.txt) | | Federation export as a bulk data read | 403 for an ordinary user on every kind | [`E-31`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/31-p3b-sync-export-scope.txt) | | Open redirect through the login `next` parameter | Ignored; redirect always to the feed | [`E-20`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/20-p3a-password-reset-and-open-redirect.txt) | The pattern is consistent and worth stating plainly to the client: the application's **authorisation and output-encoding layers are its strongest controls**, and they are stronger than the surrounding operational posture. The defects in this report are concentrated where those layers are not involved — in what the application publishes about itself, in the absence of throttling, in domain configuration and in response headers. ## Remediation roadmap The roadmap is sequenced by dependency and by the decision it unblocks, not by severity alone. Items in stage 1 are prerequisites for an enterprise security statement; stage 2 items belong in the same quarter; stage 3 items are hygiene that can ride the normal release train. ### Stage 1 — before the enterprise statement (target: 14 days) | # | Item | Findings | Effort | Depends on | Definition of done | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 1.1 | Replace the anonymous API contract with a curated public subset; protect the full contract and Swagger UI | F-01 | 1 day | None | Anonymous `GET /openapi.json` and `/docs` return 401 or a curated document with no `/admin` path; the public subset is generated from an allow-list and reviewed at each release | | 1.2 | Disable or authenticate XML-RPC introspection | F-02 | 0.5 day | None | Anonymous `system.listMethods` returns a fault; an authenticated call returns only the caller's role-visible methods | | 1.3 | Add rate limiting, progressive lockout and alerting to every authentication interface | F-03 | 3 days | Shared limiter for REST, form and XML-RPC | The tenth consecutive failure on one account returns 429 with `Retry-After`; the limit is enforced through all four interfaces; a dashboard shows failures per account and per address | | 1.4 | Require mailbox verification and remove the registration oracle | F-04 | 4 days | Mail delivery (F-05 SPF/DMARC for deliverability) | A new account cannot vote, post, message, follow or spend AI quota before verification; duplicate registration returns the same page and status as a new one; a per-address creation limit is enforced | | 1.5 | Raise the password policy and add breach screening | F-06 | 1 day | None | Passwords below twelve characters are rejected server-side; a known-breached password is rejected at registration and at change; the reset flow applies the same rule | | 1.6 | Publish SPF, DMARC and CAA; enable DNSSEC | F-05 | 1 day | Access to the DNS provider | `dig` returns an SPF record ending in `-all`, a DMARC record, a CAA record naming the CA, and a DS record; DMARC moves to `p=reject` after two clean reporting weeks | ### Stage 2 — same quarter (target: 45 days) | # | Item | Findings | Effort | Depends on | Definition of done | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 2.1 | Add `Secure` and the `__Host-` prefix to the session cookie | F-07 | 0.5 day | None | Every `Set-Cookie` for the session carries `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` and the `__Host-` prefix; a plain-HTTP request does not receive the cookie | | 2.2 | Adopt a nonce-based Content Security Policy and add Permissions-Policy | F-08 | 2 days | Inventory of inline scripts and third-party origins | The policy contains `default-src 'self'` and `script-src` with a per-response nonce; the browser console shows no violations on the landing, feed, profile, editor and admin pages | | 2.3 | Stop rendering the API key into the DOM; rotate and lengthen keys | F-10 | 2 days | None | No page source contains key material; the key is shown once at creation and on explicit re-authentication; new keys carry at least 128 random bits; old keys are rotated with a documented grace period | | 2.4 | Confirm and, if necessary, restrict the mail and SSH services on the application address | F-13 | 1 day (investigation) | Provider confirmation | Ownership is recorded; ports other than 80 and 443 are closed or firewalled to named addresses; the answer is written into the risk register | | 2.5 | Confirm the guest AI behaviour and enforce the intended quota | F-11 | 1 day | None | A guest turn either returns an explicit refusal or is metered against a server-side ceiling; aggregate guest spend is alerted | ### Stage 3 — next release train (target: 90 days) | # | Item | Findings | Effort | Depends on | Definition of done | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 3.1 | Send `Cache-Control: no-store` on every session-bearing response | F-09 | 0.5 day | None | `/feed`, `/messages`, `/notifications` and `/profile/{username}` return `no-store`; static assets keep their immutable directive | | 3.2 | Guard the numeric path parameters and return 404 for out-of-range values | F-14 | 0.5 day | None | A boundary-value regression test passes; no malformed identifier produces a 5xx | | 3.3 | Reduce the information in `robots.txt` and the public documentation; publish `security.txt` | F-15 | 1 day | Items 1.1 and 1.2 | `robots.txt` contains no administrative path; the public manual carries no administrative implementation detail; `/.well-known/security.txt` returns 200 with a monitored contact | | 3.4 | Move state-changing GET routes to POST with CSRF protection | F-12 | 1 day | None | Logout and notification acknowledgement are POST-only and carry a CSRF token; a route-registration test fails on a mutating GET | | 3.5 | Commission the two scoped follow-ups declared in the scope limitations | Coverage limits | 5 days each | None | An authorised administrator tests the administrative functions and the container runtime; the results are appended to this register | ### Sequencing rationale Items 1.1 and 1.2 are first because they are hours of work, they remove the map of the administrative surface, and they change what an enterprise reviewer sees on the first request. Items 1.3 and 1.4 are next because together they are the only path from anonymous client to account takeover that the assessment found, and because verification also closes the Sybil exposure that the social and AI features carry. Item 1.6 is placed in stage 1 despite ranking below the authentication items in direct exploitability, because the platform cannot send trustworthy transactional mail without it, and item 1.4 depends on that mail being deliverable. The stage 2 and stage 3 items are ordered so that each can ship independently; none blocks another. ## Verification and retest plan Every acceptance criterion below is written so that the client can run it from a shell and obtain a pass or fail without interpretation. The retest should be performed by a party other than the implementer, against the production configuration, within thirty days of each stage's completion. Findings are closed only when the criterion passes and the evidence is attached to the ticket. | ID | Acceptance criterion | Command or procedure | Pass condition | |---|---|---|---| | F-01 | Anonymous clients cannot obtain the administrative contract | `curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://devplace.net/openapi.json` and `grep -c '"/admin'` on the body if 200 | 401, or a 200 document containing zero `/admin` paths | | F-02 | Anonymous introspection is refused | `curl -sS -X POST https://devplace.net/xmlrpc -H 'Content-Type: text/xml' --data-binary 'system.listMethods'` | A fault response, or a method list containing no `admin.*` names | | F-03 | Authentication is throttled on every interface | Eleven consecutive failures on one account, then a correct attempt, on the form, `/auth/token`, `/api/users/auth-token` and XML-RPC Basic | At least one 429 with `Retry-After` before the eleventh attempt, on all four interfaces, and an alert raised in monitoring | | F-04 | Registration verifies the mailbox and does not leak | Register a fresh address, then register an existing address from a different client | The first account cannot vote, post, message or spend quota until verified; the second request returns the same status and body as the first, and a notice is sent to the existing address | | F-05 | Mail authentication and CAA are published | `dig +short TXT devplace.net`, `dig +short TXT _dmarc.devplace.net`, `dig +short CAA devplace.net`, `dig +short DS devplace.net` | SPF present and ending in `-all`; DMARC present; CAA present; DS present | | F-06 | Password policy is enforced server-side | Submit a six-character password to signup and to the reset flow | Both return a validation error; a known-breached twelve-character password is also rejected | | F-07 | Session cookie attributes are complete | `curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null -X POST https://devplace.net/auth/login --data-urlencode 'email=...' --data-urlencode 'password=...' \| grep -i set-cookie` | The header contains `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` and the `__Host-` prefix | | F-08 | The CSP restricts script sources | `curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null https://devplace.net/ \| grep -i content-security-policy` | The policy contains `default-src` and `script-src` with a nonce or a hash; no `unsafe-inline` on `script-src` | | F-09 | Session pages are not cacheable | `curl -sS -b cookie.txt -D - -o /dev/null https://devplace.net/feed \| grep -i cache-control` | `no-store` present on `/feed`, `/messages`, `/notifications` and `/profile/{username}` | | F-10 | No key material in the DOM | `curl -sS -b cookie.txt https://devplace.net/profile/OWN_USERNAME \| grep -c 'data-key='` | `0`; the key is obtainable only through an explicit re-authenticated action | | F-11 | Guest AI is refused or bounded | `curl -sS https://devplace.net/devii/session` and a single guest turn against a staging instance | Either `guestsEnabled:false`, or the turn is refused at the gateway, or the guest ceiling and alert are demonstrated | | F-12 | Mutating routes are POST-only | `curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://devplace.net/auth/logout` and the same for a notification | 405 on GET; the POST route requires a CSRF token | | F-13 | Only application ports are reachable | Rerun the bounded connect scan from Appendix B | 80 and 443 open; 22, 25, 143 and 993 closed or firewalled, or the shared-address dependency is documented and accepted | | F-14 | Malformed identifiers are controlled | `curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://devplace.net/api/users/99999999999999999999` | 404, or a controlled 400, never 5xx | | F-15 | Published files carry no administrative detail | `curl -sS https://devplace.net/robots.txt` and `curl -sS https://devplace.net/.well-known/security.txt` | No `Disallow` line names an administrative route; `security.txt` returns 200 | ### Regression suite Three tests should become permanent, because each guards a class that a future change could silently break. 1. **The unauthenticated matrix.** Replay all 209 documented `GET` operations without a cookie and assert that no operation that is not on the public allow-list returns 200. The script is reproduced in Appendix B and runs in under a minute at the agreed rate. 2. **The two-identity object matrix.** For each object class with an owner, create one object per identity in a test environment and assert that the cross-identity request returns 403 or 404. This is the only reliable defence against the regression that matters most. 3. **The administrative negative test.** Assert that an ordinary user's session and API key receive 403 or a login redirect on a sample of administrative routes, through REST and through XML-RPC, including a `system.multicall` batch. ### Closure criteria A finding is closed when the acceptance criterion passes on production, the evidence is attached to the ticket, and the regression test that covers the class is in the continuous pipeline. A finding is not closed by a code review, by a configuration change that has not been verified from outside, or by a compensating control that has not been documented in the risk register. ## Appendices ### Appendix A — Evidence index Every claim in this report resolves to one of the forty records below. Each file contains the engagement identifier, the UTC start and end time, the verbatim command, the exit code and the unedited combined output. The machine-readable index is at [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/evidence-index.tsv`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/evidence-index.tsv). | ID | Phase | Content | File | |---|---|---|---| | E-01 | P1 | DNS inventory: A, AAAA, NS, MX, TXT, CAA, SOA, DMARC | [`01-p1-dns-inventory.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/01-p1-dns-inventory.txt) | | E-02 | P1 | WHOIS, certificate, protocol negotiation, cipher | [`02-p1-whois-tls.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/02-p1-whois-tls.txt) | | E-03 | P1 | First certificate transparency attempt, upstream 502 | [`03-p1-crtsh.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/03-p1-crtsh.txt) | | E-04 | P1 | Certificate transparency enumeration, two sources | [`04-p1-ct-enumeration.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/04-p1-ct-enumeration.txt) | | E-05 | P1 | Resolution of all twenty-one transparency names | [`05-p1-ct-name-resolution.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/05-p1-ct-name-resolution.txt) | | E-06 | P1 | Published documents: robots, sitemap, manifest, schema, docs | [`06-p1-published-documents.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/06-p1-published-documents.txt) | | E-07 | P2 | Unauthenticated matrix, first pass, redirects followed | [`07-p2-unauth-get-matrix.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/07-p2-unauth-get-matrix.txt) | | E-08 | P2 | Unauthenticated matrix, 209 operations, redirects refused | [`08-p2-unauth-get-matrix-no-redirect.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/08-p2-unauth-get-matrix-no-redirect.txt) | | E-09 | P3 | Signup and login validation without a body | [`09-p3-signup-validation-probe.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/09-p3-signup-validation-probe.txt) | | E-10 | P3 | Synthetic account A and its cookie attributes | [`10-p3-signup-account-a.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/10-p3-signup-account-a.txt) | | E-11 | P3 | Synthetic account B and the registration oracles | [`11-p3-signup-account-b-and-enumeration.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/11-p3-signup-account-b-and-enumeration.txt) | | E-12 | P3 | Session lifecycle, first attempt with the wrong oracle | [`12-p3a-session-lifecycle.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/12-p3a-session-lifecycle.txt) | | E-13 | P3 | Session lifecycle with a valid oracle: logout, fixation, entropy | [`13-p3a-session-lifecycle-redo.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/13-p3a-session-lifecycle-redo.txt) | | E-14 | P3 | XML-RPC introspection: 379 methods anonymously | [`14-p3-xmlrpc-introspection.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/14-p3-xmlrpc-introspection.txt) | | E-15 | P3 | XML-RPC method help and administrative calls | [`15-p3-xmlrpc-authz-probe.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/15-p3-xmlrpc-authz-probe.txt) | | E-16 | P3 | Private profile tab access control | [`16-p3b-profile-private-tab-authz.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/16-p3b-profile-private-tab-authz.txt) | | E-17 | P3 | Private tab with a seeded notification event | [`17-p3b-notification-idor-with-seeded-event.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/17-p3b-notification-idor-with-seeded-event.txt) | | E-18 | P3 | Username-scoped profile writes | [`18-p3b-profile-write-idor-grouping.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/18-p3b-profile-write-idor-grouping.txt) | | E-19 | P3 | Login enumeration and lockout arithmetic | [`19-p3a-login-enumeration-and-lockout.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/19-p3a-login-enumeration-and-lockout.txt) | | E-20 | P3 | Password reset behaviour and open-redirect handling | [`20-p3a-password-reset-and-open-redirect.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/20-p3a-password-reset-and-open-redirect.txt) | | E-21 | P3 | Seeding of objects owned by account B | [`21-p3b-seed-objects-account-b.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/21-p3b-seed-objects-account-b.txt) | | E-22 | P3 | Post edit authorisation across identities | [`22-p3b-post-edit-idor.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/22-p3b-post-edit-idor.txt) | | E-23 | P3 | Attachment access control and static serving | [`23-p3c-upload-serving-and-access.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/23-p3c-upload-serving-and-access.txt) | | E-24 | P3 | Upload allow-list and filename handling | [`24-p3c-upload-active-content-and-filename.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/24-p3c-upload-active-content-and-filename.txt) | | E-25 | P3 | CORS and vertical authorisation | [`25-p3b-cors-and-vertical-authz.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/25-p3b-cors-and-vertical-authz.txt) | | E-26 | P3 | Mass assignment on the profile update | [`26-p3c-mass-assignment-profile-update.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/26-p3c-mass-assignment-profile-update.txt) | | E-27 | P3 | Stored markup in a post, rendered anonymously | [`27-p3c-stored-markup-probe.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/27-p3c-stored-markup-probe.txt) | | E-28 | P3 | SVG avatar seed injection | [`28-p3c-avatar-svg-injection.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/28-p3c-avatar-svg-injection.txt) | | E-29 | P3 | Error handling, injection markers, traversal probes | [`29-p3c-error-handling-and-injection-probes.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/29-p3c-error-handling-and-injection-probes.txt) | | E-30 | P3 | Notification open authorisation | [`30-p3b-notification-open-idor.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/30-p3b-notification-open-idor.txt) | | E-31 | P3 | Federation export authorisation, ten kinds | [`31-p3b-sync-export-scope.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/31-p3b-sync-export-scope.txt) | | E-32 | P3 | Host header injection and ingress traversal | [`32-p3c-host-header-injection.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/32-p3c-host-header-injection.txt) | | E-33 | P3 | Reflected markup, token endpoints, XML parser | [`33-p3c-reflected-xss-and-token-endpoints.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/33-p3c-reflected-xss-and-token-endpoints.txt) | | E-34 | P3 | Error page content, cache and rate headers | [`34-p3c-error-page-and-cache-headers.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/34-p3c-error-page-and-cache-headers.txt) | | E-35 | P3 | Private project access control | [`35-p3b-private-project-access.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/35-p3b-private-project-access.txt) | | E-36 | P3 | Method matrix, multicall, query-string key, guest surface | [`36-p3b-method-and-auth-bypass-probes.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/36-p3b-method-and-auth-bypass-probes.txt) | | E-37 | P3 | Security header matrix across seven response classes | [`37-p3c-security-headers-matrix.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/37-p3c-security-headers-matrix.txt) | | E-38 | P2 | Bounded connect scan of the in-scope address | [`38-p2-connect-scan-top200.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/38-p2-connect-scan-top200.txt) | | E-39 | P3 | API key material in the owner's profile DOM | [`39-p3c-api-key-dom-exposure.txt`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/39-p3c-api-key-dom-exposure.txt) | Supporting artefacts that are not themselves evidence: | Artefact | Path | Purpose | |---|---|---| | Rules of engagement | [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/00-legal/roe.md`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/00-legal/roe.md) | Authority basis, limits, forbidden actions | | Scope register | [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/00-legal/scope.tsv`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/00-legal/scope.tsv) | Every asset and its in-scope decision | | Premise | [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/01-premise/premise.md`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/01-premise/premise.md) | The six questions, answered before the first packet | | Threat model | [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/01-premise/threat-model.md`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/01-premise/threat-model.md) | Assets, actors, trust boundaries, shortest paths | | Hypothesis register | [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/01-premise/hypotheses.tsv`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/01-premise/hypotheses.tsv) | Twenty falsifiable claims and their verdicts | | API inventory | [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/02-recon/api-inventory.tsv`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/02-recon/api-inventory.tsv) | 519 operations extracted from the published contract | | OpenAPI document as served | [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/02-recon/openapi.json`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/02-recon/openapi.json) | The contract as an artefact of record | | Cleanup ledger | [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/04-impact/cleanup-ledger.md`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/files/04-impact/cleanup-ledger.md) | Every state change, its identifier and disposition | | Operator journal | [`./.record-20261110T004038Z/logs/journal.md`](./.record-20261110T004038Z/logs/journal.md) | Append-only audit trail, one line per action | ### Appendix B — Command corpus The commands below are reproduced verbatim so that an independent team can repeat the work. Placeholders in upper case must be replaced with values the client controls; no credential is reproduced here. ```bash # P1: passive collection dig +short A devplace.net; dig +short AAAA devplace.net; dig +short TXT devplace.net dig +short TXT _dmarc.devplace.net; dig +short CAA devplace.net; dig +short MX devplace.net whois devplace.net | egrep -i 'creation date|registrar|name server|status' curl -sS -m 120 -A 'record-20261110T004038Z-assessment/1.0' 'https://crt.sh/?q=devplace.net&output=json' echo | openssl s_client -connect devplace.net:443 -servername devplace.net 2>/dev/null \ | openssl x509 -noout -subject -issuer -dates -ext subjectAltName # P2: enumeration curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null https://devplace.net/ for p in /robots.txt /sitemap.xml /manifest.json /openapi.json /docs /favicon.ico; do curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "$p %{http_code} %{size_download} %{content_type}\n" "https://devplace.net$p" done python3 ./.record-20261110T004038Z/scratch/matrix2.py # 209 documented GETs, 5 req/s, no redirects python3 ./.record-20261110T004038Z/scratch/portscan.py # 175 candidate ports, connect() only # P3: authentication and session curl -sS -i -X POST https://devplace.net/auth/signup --data-urlencode 'username=NAME' \ --data-urlencode 'email=ADDRESS' --data-urlencode 'password=PASSWORD' \ --data-urlencode 'confirm_password=PASSWORD' --data-urlencode 'birth_date=1990-01-01' \ --data-urlencode 'accept_terms=1' curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null -X POST https://devplace.net/auth/login \ --data-urlencode 'email=ADDRESS' --data-urlencode 'password=WRONG' | grep -i set-cookie curl -sS -b COOKIE_JAR https://devplace.net/devii/session # session oracle curl -sS -b COOKIE_JAR -D - -o /dev/null https://devplace.net/auth/logout curl -sS -b COOKIE_JAR https://devplace.net/devii/session # must report loggedIn:false # P3: authorisation, two identities curl -sS -b COOKIE_B -X POST https://devplace.net/posts/create \ --data-urlencode 'title=T' --data-urlencode 'topic=devlog' --data-urlencode 'content=SEED' curl -sS -b COOKIE_A -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n' \ -X POST https://devplace.net/posts/edit/POST_SLUG --data-urlencode 'content=ATTEMPT' curl -sS -b COOKIE_B -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://devplace.net/projects/PRIVATE_SLUG/files curl -sS -b COOKIE_A -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://devplace.net/projects/PRIVATE_SLUG/files curl -sS -H "X-API-KEY: KEY_A" -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://devplace.net/admin/analytics curl -sS -X POST https://devplace.net/xmlrpc -H 'Content-Type: text/xml' \ --data-binary 'admin.analytics' # P3: injection and handling curl -sS "https://devplace.net/feed?search=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=window.__rx%3D1%3E" \ | grep -o -E 'value="[^"]*__rx[^"]*"' curl -sS -X POST https://devplace.net/xmlrpc -H 'Content-Type: text/xml' \ --data-binary ']>system.methodHelp&m;' curl -sS -H "X-API-KEY: KEY_A" -F 'file=@seed.txt;type=text/plain' https://devplace.net/uploads/upload curl -sS -H "X-API-KEY: KEY_A" -F 'file=@seed.svg;type=application/octet-stream' https://devplace.net/uploads/upload # P3: headers and configuration for p in / /auth/login /feed /api/users/1 /admin; do curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null "https://devplace.net$p" | grep -i -E 'content-security-policy|strict-transport|x-content-type|referrer-policy|cache-control' done curl -sS -H 'Host: unrelated.example' --resolve unrelated.example:443:95.216.15.238 -o /dev/null \ -w '%{http_code}\n' https://unrelated.example/ ``` ### Appendix C — Hypothesis register and verdicts The register was written before the first request. Five hypotheses were confirmed, eleven were refuted, three were confirmed only in part, and one could not be tested. Recording the refutations is as important as recording the findings: it is what allows the client to say that a class was tested and held, rather than that it was not looked at. | ID | Hypothesis, abbreviated | Verdict | |---|---|---| | H-01 | The published schema is a complete inventory of operations | Confirmed | | H-02 | A documented read returns non-public data anonymously | Refuted | | H-03 | The administrative surface is reachable anonymously | Refuted | | H-04 | The administrative surface is reachable by a low-privilege user | Refuted | | H-05 | An object identifier is not bound to the session | Refuted across six object classes | | H-06 | The session cookie lacks a protection attribute | Confirmed: `Secure` absent, `HttpOnly` and `SameSite` present | | H-07 | A session survives logout | Refuted | | H-08 | The login endpoint reveals whether an account exists | Refuted at login, confirmed at registration | | H-09 | Authentication has no lockout or rate limit | Confirmed | | H-10 | User markup reaches another browser unescaped | Refuted in four rendering contexts | | H-11 | Security headers are incomplete in a way that changes exploitability | Confirmed in part: no script policy; HSTS and nosniff correct | | H-12 | Errors disclose internals | Refuted | | H-13 | Secrets are readable in public scripts or configuration | Refuted, except key material in the owner's own DOM | | H-14 | Upload accepts active content or serves it as such | Refuted | | H-15 | A server-side request primitive reaches internal addresses | Not tested | | H-16 | Business logic trusts client-supplied privilege fields | Refuted | | H-17 | Infrastructure interfaces are exposed publicly | Confirmed in part: mail and SSH ports open; no debug interface | | H-18 | Transport security is weak | Refuted | | H-19 | Public content is scrapeable in bulk | Confirmed as a design property | | H-20 | "Unsafe in many ways" is substantially correct | Confirmed in the weak sense: five Medium, seven Low, three Informational, no Critical or High | ### Appendix D — Glossary | Term | Meaning in this report | |---|---| | Blast radius class | The methodology's scale of test intrusiveness; R0 is passive, R1 is a single read, R2 and R3 require written approval. This engagement stayed at R1. | | Control | A request made in the same shape as the test, against a known-good case, so that a negative result can be distinguished from a broken test. | | CVSS v3.1 | The Common Vulnerability Scoring System, version 3.1. The vector and the base score are given for every technical finding. | | Evidence record | A file containing the timestamp, verbatim command, exit code and unedited output of one action. | | IDOR | Insecure direct object reference: an operation that accepts an object identifier from the client without binding it to the session. | | OpenAPI | The machine-readable API contract served at `/openapi.json`. | | Premise | The falsifiable statement the engagement tests; if it is refuted, the refutation is the finding. | | Refuted | A hypothesis for which the control showed the weakness absent, with the evidence recorded. | | RPC | Remote procedure call; here, the XML-RPC bridge at `/xmlrpc` that mirrors the REST API. | | Session oracle | An endpoint whose response states whether the caller is authenticated; `/devii/session` was used for this purpose. | | Synthetic account | An account created by the engagement, with generated credentials, used only to test authorisation. | | XSS | Cross-site scripting: injection of markup that executes in another user's browser. | ### Appendix E — References The assessment follows the following standards and specifications by name; no external link is reproduced because the client's copy of each is authoritative. 1. OWASP Web Security Testing Guide, version 4.2 — test categories used for the coverage model. 2. OWASP Application Security Verification Standard, version 4.0.3 — authentication, session and access-control requirements. 3. OWASP Top Ten, 2021 — classification cross-reference for the risk register. 4. FIRST CVSS v3.1 Specification Document — vector construction and scoring. 5. NIST Special Publication 800-63B — authenticator and password policy guidance. 6. RFC 7208 — Sender Policy Framework. 7. RFC 7489 — Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance. 8. RFC 8659 — DNS Certification Authority Authorization. 9. RFC 6265 and the cookie-prefix specification — `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite` and the `__Host-` prefix. 10. CWE-307 (improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts), CWE-204 (observable response discrepancy), CWE-614 (sensitive cookie without `Secure`), CWE-693 (protection mechanism failure), CWE-209 (error message information exposure), CWE-1004 (sensitive cookie without `HttpOnly`). 11. The client's methodology document, `./.pentest.md` — phase model, evidence contract and gate definitions. ## Change log for this document | Date (UTC) | Version | Change | Reason | |---|---|---|---| | 2026-11-10 | 0.1 | Title block, document control, premise and scope | Gate G0 artefacts completed before testing | | 2026-11-10 | 0.5 | Scope, methodology and coverage model | Written after P1 and P2, before P3 | | 2026-11-10 | 0.9 | Findings F-01 to F-15, risk register, attack narrative | Written from the evidence corpus after P3 and P4 | | 2026-11-10 | 1.0 | Remediation roadmap, retest plan, appendices, consistency pass | Issued for client action | | 2026-11-10 | 1.0.1 | Corrected internal cross-references and finding order; replaced the illustrative password-policy command with the observed one; escaped table pipes and made every evidence link workspace-relative | Internal consistency and readability review before issue |